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A GAME OF KATSO AND MOUSE: CURRENT THEORIES FOR 
GETTING FORENSIC ANALYSIS EVIDENCE PAST THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Ronald J. Coleman and Paul F. Rothstein*  
“You still read the official statement and believe it. It’s a game, dear man, a 
shadowy game. We’re playing cat and mouse . . .” 
–Sherlock Holmes to Dr. Watson1 
Sherlock Holmes: A Game of Shadows, ROTTEN TOMATOES, https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/ 
sherlock_holmes_a_game_of_shadows/quotes/. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause ensures that an “accused” in a 
“criminal prosecution[]” has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”2 Although perhaps a simple concept, defining the scope of confrontation 
rights has proven extremely difficult. Crawford v. Washington, the leading 
Supreme Court case on this issue, announced that the Confrontation Clause only 
applies to so-called “testimonial” statements.3 The Supreme Court opted not to 
define “testimonial” in Crawford, but it would appear to include out-of-court writ-
ten or oral statements meant or understood to provide some form of evidence for 
use at trial, especially if made solemnly and to a state actor or agent.4 Pursuant to 
Crawford and its progeny, testimonial statements may not be used against a crimi-
nal defendant unless the prosecution produces the declarant as a witness for cross- 
examination.5 
The law has had particular difficulty in scoping confrontation rights in forensic 
analysis cases, such as those where the prosecution seeks to utilize a laboratory 
report of DNA, blood alcohol content, narcotics, or other “CSI” type analyses. In 
such cases, what should it mean to afford an accused the right to confront the “wit-
ness” providing evidence “against” her? Should the machine or report itself be 
* Paul F. Rothstein is a Professor of Law teaching Evidence and other subjects related to trial processes at 
Georgetown Law. Ronald J. Coleman is a Program Attorney and Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown Law, 
and he is a member of the Bars in New York and New Jersey. They have written and published together on the 
Supreme Court’s new and developing Confrontation Clause jurisprudence several times. © 2019, Ronald J. 
Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein. 
1. 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to confront also applies to states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
3. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
4. Id. at 51, 58; see also Paul F. Rothstein, Unwrapping the Box the Supreme Court Justices Have Gotten 
Themselves Into: Internal Confrontations over Confronting the Confrontation Clause, 58 HOW. L.J. 479, 480 
(2015). 
5. That is, except where the declarant is unavailable and there has been some sufficient prior opportunity to 
cross-examine such declarant. Id. at 59. 
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considered the accusing “witness,” or should a human witness need to be pro-
duced? If a human witness is required, should it be the individual conducting 
the test, the one preparing the report, a supervisor responsible for reviewing and 
quality-controlling the report, or someone else? Should it matter whether the indi-
vidual was involved in the test at all? Should it matter whether the report was pre-
pared for use against the defendant or for some other purpose, such as medical 
treatment? And what if the prosecution does not seek to enter the report into evi-
dence at all, but instead offers testimony from an independent expert who discusses 
the contents of the report? With so many issues to consider, prosecutors and 
defendants may have difficulty predicting how the Confrontation Clause will apply 
in any given forensic analysis case. Indeed, in the absence of clear guidance, these 
stakeholders may resort to something of a game of admissibility “cat and mouse,” 
under which evasion and posturing becomes the substitute for clear rules and pre-
dictable outcomes. 
Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Stuart v. Alabama, Justice 
Gorsuch recently recognized the “decisive role” of forensic evidence in mod-
ern criminal trials, but decried the lack of clarity in this area of law, noting the 
confusion sown by Williams v. Illinois, the Supreme Court’s last word on this 
point.6 The Supreme Court has long appeared eager to find a mechanism for 
mitigating the difficulties of applying Crawford to the forensic analysis con-
text. Williams seems to have further exacerbated the problem. The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Armed Forces adopted an innovative approach to forensic 
analysis evidence under the Confrontation Clause in United States v. Katso.7 A 
Katso-like approach has appeal given its focus on assuring an adequate basis 
for cross-examination and illumination of errors and biases.8 Recognition of a 
Katso-like approach could be one sensible path for the Court to take, but when 
faced with the opportunity to adopt such an approach in Stuart, the Court opted 
to deny certiorari and leave the law unresolved.9 
The purpose of this Article is to analyze modern Confrontation Clause and 
forensic analysis jurisprudence and present six theories through which to argue 
that forensic analysis evidence is admissible consistent with the Confrontation 
Clause. The theories presented here are not intended to be employed individu-
ally, but rather combined to diminish the possibility that the Confrontation 
Clause will necessitate exclusion of such evidence. Part I discusses back-
ground on the Confrontation Clause. Part II describes the recent illustrative 
cases of Katso and Stuart. Part III presents our six theories and explores how 
6. 139 S. Ct. 36, 36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion. The facts of Stuart are discussed below. 
See infra Part II.B. 
7. 74 M.J. 273 (C.A.A.F. 2015). The facts of Katso are discussed below. See infra Part II.A. 
8. See id. at 282. 
9. See generally Stuart, 139 S. Ct. 36. 
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local stakeholders might utilize Katso-like reasoning to support their 
positions. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
In the nearly quarter century prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Crawford,10 the “reliability” analysis set out in Ohio v. Roberts11 guided the courts 
in Confrontation Clause cases. Under the Roberts regime, in order to admit a hear-
say statement against a criminal defendant, the Confrontation Clause required the 
non-testifying declarant to be unavailable and the statement itself to be reliable 
(that is, it needed to “bear[] adequate ‘indicia of reliability’”).12 In Crawford, how-
ever, the Supreme Court rejected the Roberts reliability test and ushered in the 
modern Confrontation Clause paradigm, which analyzes whether the statement in 
question is “testimonial.”13 In this Part, we will provide background on the testimo-
nial statement paradigm, the primary purpose analysis, and the Confrontation 
Clause and forensic analysis evidence. 
A. Testimonial Statement Paradigm 
In Crawford, a defendant, Michael Crawford, was charged with crimes relating 
to stabbing another man, and the state sought to introduce certain tape-recorded 
statements made to the police by the defendant’s wife (who was unable to testify 
pursuant to state marital privilege rules).14 Crawford argued that admission of 
the tape-recorded statements violated his federal Confrontation Clause rights,15 
but the tape was played for the jury and Crawford was convicted.16 Following 
appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and found that admission of the 
taped statements without the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant violated 
the Confrontation Clause.17 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, considered the Clause’s text and the 
lengthy common law history of the right to confront.18 He concluded that, 
although the ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause is reliability of evidence, 
the Clause grants a procedural right to have such reliability tested in a specific 
manner: cross-examination.19 The text of the Clause applies to a “witness 
10. 541 U.S. at 36. 
11. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
12. Id. at 66 (citation omitted). Pursuant to Roberts, reliability could be inferred where evidence falls into a 
“firmly rooted hearsay exception.” Id. 
13. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–53. 
14. Id. at 38–40. Under Washington state law, marital privilege generally barred a spouse from testifying in 
the absence of consent from the other spouse, but such privilege did not cover out-of-court statements made by a 
spouse which were admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception. Id. at 40. 
15. Id. at 40–41. 
16. Id. at 38. 
17. Id. at 38–42, 68–69. 
18. Id. at 42–61. 
19. Id. 
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against” an accused, in other words, those bearing “testimony.”20 “Testimony” 
would typically be a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.”21 Justice Scalia found that, consistent with 
the history and text of the Clause, a certain class of out-of-court statements 
made by a non-testifying witness could be considered “testimonial.”22 He fur-
ther found that such statements could not be introduced against a criminal de-
fendant, absent unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.23 
Justice Scalia did not provide a full definition of what would fall within the cate-
gory of “testimonial” statements, but he acknowledged that the category at least 
covered statements made during police interrogations, as well as prior testimony 
at a former trial, before the grand jury, or at a preliminary hearing.24 
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist registered his disapproval of 
the Court’s new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.25 He noted that while 
the Court left setting out a “comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial’” for another 
day, state and federal prosecutors “need[ed] answers as to what beyond the specific 
kinds of ‘testimony’ the Court lists . . . is covered by the new rule.”26 The Court 
had, according to the Chief Justice, “cast[] a mantle of uncertainty over future 
criminal trials in both federal and state courts[.]”27 
In future cases, the Court would seek to better define the contours of the 
Crawford paradigm. One important consideration the Court has analyzed is the 
“primary purpose” of the statement. 
B. Primary Purpose Analysis 
In evaluating whether a given statement is testimonial, the Court has analyzed 
the statement’s objective “primary purpose.”28 Specifically, as set out in Michigan 
v. Bryant,29 if the Court determines that the objective primary purpose of the state-
ment is to create an ex parte substitute for in-court testimony (e.g., to prove prior 
events potentially relevant to subsequent prosecution), the statement will be testi-
monial.30 If, however, the statement is made for some other purpose, such as to aid 
in an ongoing emergency, it will be nontestimonial.31 Although Bryant is the 
20. Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
21. Id. (citing 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). 
22. Id. at 42–68. 
23. Id. at 68. 
24. Id. In one of the formulations of the “testimonial” class of statements that Justice Scalia references as an 
example, such statements include the “functional equivalent” of “ex parte in-court testimony . . . that declarants 
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.” Id. at 51 (citation omitted). 
25. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice O’Connor joined the Chief Justice in his concurrence. Id. 
26. Id. at 68, 75. 
27. Id. at 69. 
28. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
29. 562 U.S. 344. 
30. Id. at 356–59. 
31. See id. 
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leading case on the Court’s “primary purpose” analysis, it built upon the Court’s 
earlier decision in Davis v. Washington.32 In Davis, the Court considered two con-
solidated appeals of domestic disturbance cases: (1) State v. Davis,33 in which the 
prosecution sought to enter evidence from a 911 call prior to police arriving on the 
scene;34 and (2) Hammon v. State,35 in which the prosecution sought to introduce 
statements made by the victim after the police arrived and the accused seemed 
under control.36 The Court determined that statements made during the course of 
police interrogations would be nontestimonial if made under circumstances which 
objectively indicate that the “primary purpose” of such interrogation is to assist 
police in meeting an ongoing emergency.37 Conversely, such statements would be 
testimonial where circumstances objectively indicated no ongoing emergency 
existed, and the interrogation’s “primary purpose” was to prove or establish prior 
events potentially relevant to subsequent prosecution.38 Consistent with these 
determinations, the Court found that the statements made after officers arrived on 
the scene in Hammon were testimonial, but the statements made during the 911 
call prior to police arrival in State v. Davis were nontestimonial.39 
Bryant greatly expanded upon the “primary purpose” concept discussed in 
Davis v. Washington.40 In Bryant, the police found a gunshot victim mortally 
wounded in a gas station parking lot.41 Statements made by the victim to the police 
minutes prior to the arrival of emergency medical services implicated Richard 
Bryant.42 The victim was brought to the hospital where he passed away in the fol-
lowing hours.43 At Bryant’s trial, police officers from the scene testified as to what 
the victim told them.44 Bryant was convicted of, among other things, second-  
32. 547 U.S. 813. 
33. 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005). 
34. The Court noted that even if 911 operators are not law enforcement officers, they may be considered 
agents of law enforcement where they interrogate 911 callers. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2. Accordingly, the 
Court considered, for purposes of its opinion and without offering a decision on the point, such operators’ acts to 
be police acts, and left open when or if a statement made to an individual other than law enforcement personnel 
would be “testimonial.” Id. 
35. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
36. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819–21. 
37. Id. at 818–22. 
38. Id. at 822. 
39. Id. at 827–31. In his opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, Justice Thomas 
noted that the Court in Crawford had abandoned the Roberts reliability analysis (which it had described as 
“inherently, and therefore permanently, unpredictable”), and two years later in Davis, the Court was adopting an 
“equally unpredictable” test which requires district courts to “divin[e] the ‘primary purpose’ of police 
interrogations.” Id. at 834 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis 
omitted). 
40. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358–60 (2011). 
41. Id. at 349. 
42. Id. at 349–50. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
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degree murder.45 After appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.46 
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court, reaffirmed that an “ongoing emer-
gency” was one of the most important circumstances that informs the “primary 
purpose” of the interrogation,47 but noted that it was not the only possible such 
circumstance: 
Whether formal or informal, out-of-court statements can evade the basic 
objective of the Confrontation Clause, which is to prevent the accused from 
being deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about state-
ments taken for use at trial. When, as in Davis, the primary purpose of an 
interrogation is to respond to an “ongoing emergency,” its purpose is not to 
create a record for trial and thus is not within the scope of the Clause. But 
there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a 
statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court 
substitute for trial testimony. In making the primary purpose determination, 
standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, 
will be relevant. Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a 
statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the 
Confrontation Clause.48 
Unlike in Davis, Bryant required the Court to consider a situation where an 
“ongoing emergency” extended beyond the instant victim to include potential 
threats to responding police and the general public.49 In determining whether the 
“primary purpose” of a police interrogation was to assist in an “ongoing emer-
gency,” the Court noted it would “objectively evaluate the circumstances in which 
the encounter occur[ed] and the statements and actions of the parties.”50 The Court 
considered such circumstances, statements, and actions in Bryant, and concluded 
that the victim’s statements were not testimonial and the Confrontation Clause 
would not bar their admission.51 
45. Id. It should be noted that Bryant’s trial took place prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crawford and 
Davis, but such precedent would have been considered on appeal. Id. at 350. 
46. Id. at 352. 
47. Id. at 361. This would be the case because such emergency focuses those involved on something other 
than proving prior events potentially relevant to subsequent prosecution. Id. at 358–61. 
48. Id. at 358–59. 
49. Id. at 359. 
50. Id. The Court pointed out that an additional benefit of this approach was that it would ameliorate issues 
associated with looking at only one participant’s intention—in particular the problem of “mixed motives” of the 
interrogators and declarants. Id. at 367–69. Examples of mixed motives discussed by the Court included police 
acting as both criminal investigators and first responders, and victims making statements to police to end a threat 
but also wanting an attacker to be incapacitated or rehabilitated. Id. at 368. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, was “at a 
loss” as to how the Court’s analysis would ameliorate the “mixed motive” problem, given that if it were difficult 
to discern the primary purpose of a declarant with a mixed motive, adding the “mixed motives” of a police officer 
would only compound the difficulty. Id. at 383 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
51. Id. at 377–78. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered many items, including for example that 
the case involved a gun, that the victim’s statements did not indicate the dispute was private or that the threat had 
ended, that neither the victim nor the police knew the shooter’s location, that the victim was suffering from a 
mortal wound and bleeding, and that the situation and interrogation was informal. Id. at 374–77. 
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Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment because he felt that the victim’s 
questioning lacked sufficient “formality and solemnity” for such statements to be 
“testimonial.”52 He criticized the “primary purpose” test for being “‘an exercise 
in fiction’ that is ‘disconnected from history’ and [that] ‘yields no predictable 
results.’”53 
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, charged the Court with being the 
“obfuscator of last resort.”54 He argued that the Court’s decision would require 
“judges to conduct open-ended balancing tests and amorphous, if not entirely sub-
jective, inquiries into the totality of the circumstances bearing upon reliability.”55 
He also pointed to the “incoherent” result of the Court’s attempt to “fit its resur-
rected interest in reliability into the Crawford framework,” when in fact “[r]eliabil-
ity tells us nothing about whether a statement is testimonial.”56 Justice Scalia 
further stated that neither Davis nor Crawford addressed whose perspective was 
significant when assessing an interrogation’s primary purpose: the interrogator’s, 
the declarant’s, or both.57 According to Justice Scalia, while the Court in Bryant 
chose to adopt a test based on the purposes of both, solely the declarant’s intention 
should be relevant.58 
52. Id. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
53. Id. at 379 (citing his own opinion, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 (2006)). 
54. Id. at 380 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
55. Id. at 393 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. 
Washington: Why and How, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115, 132–37 (2012) (discussing problems with “primary 
purpose” test in Davis and Bryant). 
56. Bryant, 562 U.S. at 392. For instance, Justice Scalia noted that: 
Hearsay law exempts business records . . . because businesses have a financial incentive to keep 
reliable records. . . . The Sixth Amendment also generally admits business records into evidence, 
but not because the records are reliable or because hearsay law says so. It admits them “because— 
having been created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of estab-
lishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not” weaker substitutes for live testimony.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
57. Id. at 381. 
58. Id. at 381–82. As Justice Scalia stated: 
For an out-of-court statement to qualify as testimonial, the declarant must intend the statement to 
be a solemn declaration rather than an unconsidered or offhand remark; and he must make the 
statement with the understanding that it may be used to invoke the coercive machinery of the State 
against the accused.  
Id. at 381. Accordingly, the “hidden purpose of an interrogator cannot substitute for the declarant’s intentional 
solemnity or his understanding of how his words may be used.” Id. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion, 
agreed that it was the declarant’s intention that was relevant, and the decision of the Court “confounds our recent 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, . . . which made it plain that ‘[r]eliability tells us nothing about whether a 
statement is testimonial [.]’” Id. at 395 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Ginsburg also noted 
that “dying declarations”—“statements made by a person about to die and aware that death was imminent”— 
were a well-established exception to admitting out-of-court statements in the law inherited from England, and, 
had that issue been properly raised before the Court, she would have taken up the question of whether such 
exception survived recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 395–96. 
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While courts may have difficulty making “primary purpose” determinations and 
evaluating whether statements are testimonial, such difficulty is compounded 
when courts are faced with cases involving statements resulting from forensic anal-
ysis, such as those contained in laboratory reports. It is to this area that we now 
turn. 
C. Confrontation Clause and Forensic Analysis Evidence 
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has had several occasions to consider 
forensic analysis evidence in the context of the Confrontation Clause: Melendez- 
Diaz v. Massachusetts,59 Bullcoming v. New Mexico,60 and Williams v. Illinois.61 
Melendez-Diaz was the first major Supreme Court case in this area. 
1. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 
Luis Melendez-Diaz was charged with crimes related to selling cocaine.62 
Melendez-Diaz and another man, Thomas Wright, were arrested after the police 
found several clear plastic bags containing a substance that looked like cocaine on 
Wright and “hidden” in the police cruiser that brought the two men to the station.63 
The prosecution entered the seized bags into evidence at trial along with three “cer-
tificates of analysis” presenting results of forensic analysis performed on the sub-
stances.64 Such certificates reflected the weight of the bags and that the seized 
substance contained cocaine.65 As required under Massachusetts law, the certifi-
cates had also been sworn before a notary by analysts at a Massachusetts state labo-
ratory.66 Over Melendez-Diaz’s objection that Crawford required in-person 
testimony by the analysts if the certificates were to be admitted, such certificates 
were admitted as “prima facie evidence” of the analyzed narcotic and Melendez- 
Diaz was convicted.67 Following the appeals process, the U.S. Supreme Court took 
the case.68 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, had “little doubt” that the certificates fell 
within the “core class of testimonial statements” the Court previously described in  
59. 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
60. 564 U.S. 647 (2011). 
61. 567 U.S. 50 (2012). 
62. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308. 
63. Id. Four of the clear white plastic bags were found when police searched Wright. Id. Once the men were 
taken to the station, police did a search of the police cruiser and found a bag containing nineteen smaller bags 
hidden in the partition between the seats. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 309. 
68. Id. 
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Crawford.69 Although referred to as “certificates,” such documents were “quite 
plainly” affidavits.70 They were “functionally identical” to in-court testimony, 
doing exactly what a witness would do on direct examination.71 Not only would 
the circumstances lead an objective witness to reasonably believe they would be 
used at trial, but their “sole purpose” under state law was to provide “prima facie 
evidence.”72 Moreover, despite the argument advanced that the analysts were not 
subject to the Confrontation Clause because they were not “accusatory” or “con-
ventional” witnesses, Justice Scalia found that the analysts themselves were “wit-
nesses” for purposes of the Clause.73 Nor was Justice Scalia persuaded that the 
“resul[t] of [allegedly] neutral, scientific testing” should be treated differently for 
Confrontation Clause purposes than a witness recounting past events.74 The Court 
concluded that it was error to admit the certificates.75 
Justice Thomas concurred because he agreed with the Court that the certificates 
were affidavits. However, he wrote separately to make clear his position that the 
Confrontation Clause only covers statements in “formalized testimonial materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”76 
In Justice Kennedy’s dissent, joined by Justices Alito, Breyer, and Roberts, he 
argued, among other things, that: (1) there was no need to produce the analyst who 
prepared the scientific analysis in order to support admission of such analysis; (2) a 
distinction existed between “conventional witnesses” (to whom the Clause 
applied) and testing analysts (to whom it did not); and (3) the Court’s decision 
69. Id. at 310. Justice Scalia cited to such description of the class of testimonial statements from Crawford: 
Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex parte in-court testimony 
or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior tes-
timony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declar-
ants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements . . . contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; 
statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.  
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
70. Id. (citing Affidavits, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), which defines affidavits as “declaration[s] 
of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths”). Justice 
Scalia stated that the certificates were “incontrovertibly a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose 
of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
71. Id. at 310–11 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 313–17. 
74. Id. at 317. For instance, Justice Scalia noted that confrontation is a means of ensuring accurate forensic 
analysis and was designed to weed out both the fraudulent and incompetent analyst. Id. at 318–19. Justice Scalia 
was also unpersuaded by other arguments advanced, including that the certificates should not be subject to the 
Confrontation Clause because they were similar to business or official records, that Melendez-Diaz had 
the ability to subpoena the witnesses, or that the “necessities of trial and the adversary process” suggested the 
requirements of the Clause be relaxed. Id. at 319–32. Justice Scalia doubted that the “sky w[ould] . . . fall” due to 
the burdens on the system and pointed out that so-called “notice-and-demand” statutes (which may require a 
defendant to demand their right to confront an analyst), could further ease any burden. Id. at 325–27. 
75. Id. at 329. 
76. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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would present logistical difficulties and harm law enforcement efforts.77 In particu-
lar, the dissent argued that many individuals are often involved in forensic drug 
tests and that it would not be clear which individual would need to testify, or 
whether all of them would.78 If all such individuals were required to testify, the dis-
sent charged that the Court had basically “forbidden the use of scientific tests in 
criminal trials.”79 
After Melendez-Diaz, the next major Supreme Court case relating to the 
Confrontation Clause and forensic analysis evidence was Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico.80 Bullcoming gave the Court another chance to consider which, if any, an-
alyst(s) would be required to testify in support of forensic analysis. 
2. Bullcoming v. New Mexico 
In Bullcoming, Donald Bullcoming was arrested for driving while intoxicated, 
and the principal piece of evidence at trial was a laboratory report which certified 
that Bullcoming’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was well above the relevant 
threshold.81 The BAC test required use of a device called a gas chromatograph 
machine.82 Operation of such a device requires “specialized knowledge and train-
ing,” and human error may occur at each step of the gas chromatograph process.83 
At trial, rather than producing the analyst who signed the actual certification, the 
prosecution instead offered a separate analyst, who neither observed nor partici-
pated in the test on Bullcoming’s blood, but was familiar with the testing proce-
dures of the laboratory.84 The New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that, in 
view of Melendez-Diaz, the BAC analysis was testimonial.85 However, it con-
cluded that live testimony from an analyst other than the certifying analyst was suf-
ficient.86 First, it found that the certifying analyst was a “mere scrivener” who  
77. Id. at 330–63. Commenters have also discussed problems with the Court’s Melendez-Diaz opinion. See, 
e.g., Crump, supra note 55, at 137–43; Andrew W. Eichner, The Failures of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and 
the Unstable Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 437 (2011). 
78. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 332–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For example, the Court discusses the 
following individuals as playing a role in a forensic drug test: (1) a person preparing the sample, putting it in 
a machine for testing, and retrieving the machine printout; (2) an individual to interpret the machine printout; 
(3) a person who calibrated the machine and certified that it was in good working order; and (4) a person—such 
as a laboratory director—who has certified that the subordinates in the laboratory have followed established 
procedures. Id. 
79. Id. The Court also pointed to harms in other contexts, including authentication of documents and 
establishing chain of custody. Id. at 335. 
80. 564 U.S. 647 (2011). 
81. Id. at 651. 
82. Id. at 654. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 651. It should be noted that the certifying analyst who was not produced had been very recently 
placed on unpaid leave for unrevealed reasons. Id. at 655. 
85. Id. at 656. 
86. Id. at 651–52. 
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only transcribed results that the gas chromatograph machine generated.87 Second, 
although the testifying analyst did not participate in the test itself, he was a quali-
fied expert witness with respect to the gas chromatograph machine and so could 
serve as a “surrogate” for the certifying analyst.88 The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed the New Mexico Supreme Court’s judgment.89 
The Court found that admission of the forensic report containing a testimonial 
certification through the live testimony of a scientist who did not perform the test 
reported in the certification, observe the performance of such test, or sign the certi-
fication, violated the Confrontation Clause.90 Such “surrogate” testimony, the 
Court determined, was insufficient.91 The certifying expert was not a “mere scriv-
ener” because (1) he made multiple representations not in the raw machine data, 
including that the sample was intact and the seal unbroken; (2) the sample number 
and report number corresponded; (3) he adhered to a protocol; and (4) no condition 
or circumstance affected the validity of the analysis or integrity of the sample.92 
Further, the “surrogate” testimony of the non-certifying analyst could not convey 
what the certifying expert knew or observed regarding the events his certification 
concerned, nor could it expose any lies or lapses on the certifying expert’s part.93 
The Court also rejected the state’s argument that the affirmations in question were 
not testimonial.94 Even though the statements in Melendez-Diaz were sworn and 
the BAC report in Bullcoming was unsworn, the formalities of the report were suf-
ficient to render the certifying expert’s assertions testimonial.95 Justice Ginsburg 
argued, in a part of her opinion not commanding a majority of the Court,96 that a 
constitutional requirement could not be disregarded for convenience, that the 
Court’s opinion would not be altered due to the potential burdens on prosecution, 
and that predictions of dire consequences were dubious.97 
87. Id. at 657 (citation omitted). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 657–58. 
90. Id. at 652. Justices Kagan and Sotomayor joined all but Part IV of the Court’s opinion, and Justice Thomas 
joined all but footnote 6 (relating to a statement being “testimonial” if such statement has the “primary purpose” 
of proving or establishing past events potentially relevant to subsequent prosecution) and Part IV. Id. at 651 n.*, 
659 n.6. 
91. Id. at 652. 
92. Id. at 660. 
93. Id. at 661–62. The Court found potentially significant that the testifying analyst was placed on unpaid 
leave, and the testifying analyst could not speak to that issue. Id. The Court also noted that the state had not 
asserted that the testifying expert had an independent opinion on Bullcoming’s BAC. Id. at 662. 
94. Id. at 664–65. 
95. Id. 
96. This part of her opinion was Part IV, in which Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Thomas did not join. Id. at 
651 n.*. 
97. Id. at 665 (citations omitted). The Court noted, for example, that retesting of the sample or the existence of 
a notice-and-demand procedure might mitigate the burdens on law enforcement. Id. at 665–67. The Court also 
noted that few cases actually go to trial, and that in forensic cases, defendants will often stipulate to admission of 
the forensic analysis. Id. at 667. Finally, the Court pointed out that, in jurisdictions where an analyst’s appearance 
is part of her job, the “sky has not fallen.” Id. 
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Justice Kennedy dissented, along with Justices Roberts, Breyer, and Alito, argu-
ing that the Court should not have taken the “serious misstep” of expanding 
Melendez-Diaz to require testimony of the preparing analyst.98 The dissent also 
noted that concepts such as “solemnity,” “reliability,” and the distinction between 
utterances aimed at helping police keep the peace and those targeted at proving 
past events have “weaved in and out of the Crawford jurisprudence.”99 The dissent 
pointed to the “ambiguities” in the Court’s approach and the difficulty in determin-
ing who would need to testify.100 It also argued that the Court’s approach would 
have an adverse effect on states and prosecutions.101 
One of the most interesting opinions was Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence. 
Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to highlight that the report was testimonial 
because its “primary purpose” was evidentiary,102 and to emphasize the limited na-
ture of the Court’s opinion.103 In particular, Justice Sotomayor described four 
“factual circumstances” not presented in, and therefore not addressed by, 
Bullcoming.104 First, it was not a case in which a prosecutor advanced an alterna-
tive purpose for the report (such as the need to provide Bullcoming with medical 
treatment).105 Second, it was not a case in which the testifying individual was a 
reviewer, supervisor, or other individual with personal, albeit limited, connection 
to the relevant test.106 Justice Sotomayor noted that it would be a different situation 
if a supervisor who had observed the analyst conducting the test, for instance, were 
testifying about the results of a test or a report about such results.107 However, she 
noted that the degree of involvement required did not need to be decided in the 
context of Bullcoming.108 Third, it was not a case in which a qualified expert wit-
ness was asked for an independent opinion based on underlying reports not them-
selves admitted (pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 703).109 Justice Sotomayor 
98. Id. at 674–75 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
99. Id. at 678. 
100. Id. at 679–80. 
101. Id. at 682–84 (noting that “increases in subpoenas will further impede the sate laboratory’s ability to 
keep pace with its obligations”). 
102. Id. at 668 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor found that, notwithstanding the report not 
being sworn, for the reasons advanced by the Court, the report and certification had the “primary purpose of 
creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” Id. at 670 (citation omitted). 
103. Id. at 668. 
104. Id. at 668, 672–74. 
105. Id. at 672. 
106. Id. at 672–73. 
107. Id. at 673. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. FED. R. EVID. 703 states that: 
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of 
or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of 
facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to 
be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion 
may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion 
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.  
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continued that it would be a different question whether such an expert could dis-
cuss the testimonial statements of others where such statements were not, them-
selves, admitted.110 Fourth, and finally, it was not a case where a state sought to 
admit only machine-generated raw data in conjunction with expert witness testi-
mony, and so the Court needed not decide that.111 
Perhaps fortuitously, in the next major Supreme Court case on the Confrontation 
Clause and forensic analysis evidence, Williams v. Illinois,112 the Court was 
afforded the opportunity to consider a case analogous to Justice Sotomayor’s third 
factual circumstance: the “expert witness” asked for an “independent opinion” 
regarding an “underlying testimonial” report not itself admitted.113 The Court in 
Williams would have great difficulty grappling with this issue, and would ulti-
mately produce an opinion that confused more than it clarified. 
3. Williams v. Illinois 
In Williams, a case concerning rape among other alleged crimes, a sample of 
the victim’s blood and vaginal swabs were taken while she was being treated at the 
hospital.114 A forensic scientist at a state police laboratory confirmed the presence 
of semen.115 Evidence suggested that the vaginal swabs were then sent to a separate 
outside laboratory, Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory, which responded with a 
report containing the DNA profile of a male based on semen from the swabs.116 At 
that point, Sandy Williams was not yet a suspect for the rape.117 
A forensic specialist at the state police laboratory, Sandra Lambatos, then con-
ducted a computer search to confirm whether Cellmark’s profile matched an entry 
in the DNA database, and the computer found a match with Williams.118 After the 
victim identified Williams in a lineup, Williams was indicted, and he opted for a 
bench trial before a state judge.119 The prosecution called three expert forensic wit-
nesses to testify in connection with linking Williams to the crime through DNA: 
(1) a forensic scientist at the state police lab who confirmed presence of semen on 
the swabs using an acid phosphatase test; (2) a state forensic scientist who had 
developed a DNA profile from a blood sample previously collected from Williams 
by using Short Tandem Repeat (STR) and Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) 
110. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 673. 
111. Id. at 673–74. For a more detailed analysis of what issues the Court decided in Bullcoming and what 
issues it left open, see Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, Grabbing the Bullcoming by the Horns: How the 
Supreme Court Could Have Used Bullcoming v. New Mexico to Clarify Confrontation Clause Requirements for 
CSI-Type Reports, 90 NEB. L. REV. 502 (2011). 
112. 567 U.S. 50 (2012). 
113. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 673. 
114. Williams, 567 U.S. at 59. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 59–60. 
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techniques; and (3) Lambatos, offered as an expert in forensic DNA analysis and 
forensic biology.120 
Lambatos testified regarding, among other things: (a) the process of using STR 
and PCR to generate DNA profiles; (b) how one DNA profile could be matched to 
another; (c) how it was common for one DNA expert to rely on records from 
another such expert; (d) chain-of-custody issues; and (e) her comparison of the 
semen from the vaginal swabs with the DNA profile of Williams which she would 
call a “match.”121 The Cellmark report was never admitted into evidence or shown 
to the factfinder, but Lambatos admitted on cross-examination that her testimony 
relied on the Cellmark profile, even though she did not observe or conduct any test-
ing on the swabs.122 
The defense sought to exclude portions of Lambatos’ testimony implicating 
events at Cellmark based on the Confrontation Clause.123 The prosecution, invok-
ing a state evidence rule similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 703, argued that 
Lambatos was entitled to disclose facts forming the basis of her opinion even if she 
was not competent to testify as to such underlying facts.124 The lower courts 
refused to exclude the testimony, with the Supreme Court of Illinois finding that 
when the report was referenced by Lambatos, it was not being offered for “the truth 
of the matter asserted,” but instead to show the underlying data and facts used in 
rendering her expert opinion.125 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.126 
Id. For a debate on issues raised in connection with Williams and published just before the Supreme 
Court’s opinion was issued, see Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, Williams v. Illinois and the 
Confrontation Clause, PUBLICSQUARE.NET (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.publicsquare.net/2011/12/williams-v- 
illinois-confrontation-clause/. 
Justice Alito authored the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Roberts, 
Kennedy, and Breyer.127 Justice Alito found the Confrontation Clause inapplicable 
for two independent reasons: (1) the Cellmark report was not offered for its truth; 
and (2) it was not prepared with the “primary purpose” of accusing Williams.128 As 
to the “offered for truth” point, Justice Alito began by reiterating the long-accepted 
principle that an expert witness could offer an opinion based on facts relating to 
the events in a case, even where that expert lacked first-hand knowledge of such 
facts.129 Although in jury trials, Illinois state and federal law normally precluded 
120. Id. at 60. 
121. Id. at 60–62. 
122. Id. at 62. 
123. Id. at 62–63. 
124. Id. at 63. 
125. Id. at 64. 
126. 
127. Williams, 567 U.S. at 55. Although Justice Alito’s opinion is referred to as the “plurality” opinion, the 
dissent notes that “in all except [the plurality opinion’s] disposition, [Justice Alito’s plurality] opinion is a 
dissent: Five Justices specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph of its explication.” Id. 
at 120 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
128. Id. at 64–86. 
129. Id. at 67. Courts at common law had dealt with this situation through either (1) an expert’s reliance on 
facts already established in the record; or (2) use of a hypothetical question to the expert (through which such 
40                                AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW                                [Vol. 57:27 
experts from disclosing inadmissible evidence underlying their testimony, no such 
restriction was placed on bench trials (as in this case).130 Justice Alito noted that 
Crawford had reaffirmed the point that the Confrontation Clause did not preclude 
use of testimonial statements for a purpose other than establishing their truth.131 He 
said it was helpful to inventory what Lambatos had actually testified to with 
respect to Cellmark: 
She testified to the truth of the following matters: Cellmark was an accredited 
lab . . . ; the ISP [state police laboratory] occasionally sent forensic samples to 
Cellmark for DNA testing . . . ; according to shipping manifests admitted into 
evidence, the ISP lab sent vaginal swabs taken from the victim to Cellmark 
and later received those swabs back from Cellmark . . . ; and, finally, the 
Cellmark DNA profile matched a profile produced by the ISP lab from a sam-
ple of petitioner’s blood. . . . Lambatos had personal knowledge of all of these 
matters, and therefore none of this testimony infringed petitioner’s confronta-
tion right. 
Lambatos did not testify to the truth of any other matter concerning Cellmark. 
She made no other reference to the Cellmark report, which was not admitted 
into evidence and was not seen by the trier of fact. Nor did she testify to any-
thing that was done at the Cellmark lab, and she did not vouch for the quality 
of Cellmark’s work.132 
Justice Alito stated that the principal argument purportedly supporting a 
Confrontation Clause violation was the following testimony (as referenced by the 
dissent): 
Q: Was there a computer match generated of the male DNA profile found in 
semen from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] [the victim] to a male DNA profile that 
had been identified as having originated from Sandy Williams? 
A: Yes, there was.133 
Justice Alito pointed out that the dissent believed the italicized portion of the 
above testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because Lambatos did not have 
personal knowledge that Cellmark’s profile was based on the victim’s swabs.134 
According to Justice Alito, however, the italicized portion was not offered for its 
truth, but rather to simply reflect the premise of the question posed.135 He conceded 
that the dissent’s argument “would have force” if Williams had opted for a jury 
expert was asked to assume certain factual predicates were true and to voice an opinion based on the given 
assumptions). Id. More recently, courts have allowed experts to offer opinions predicated on facts about which 
they do not have personal knowledge and no longer require the hypothetical question. Id. at 69. 
130. Id. at 69–70. 
131. Id. at 70. 
132. Id. at 70–71 (citations omitted). 
133. Id. at 71 (citations omitted). 
134. Id. at 72. 
135. Id. 
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trial rather than a bench trial.136 Justice Alito noted that his conclusion was consist-
ent with Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz in that the reports in those cases were 
introduced and there was no question this was done to prove the truth of the 
reports’ assertions.137 
As to the “primary purpose” point, Justice Alito noted that even if the report had 
been admitted for its truth, there would be no Confrontation Clause violation 
because the Confrontation Clause refers to testimony by a “witness against” an 
accused.138 The Court had previously identified two characteristics of the abuses 
prompting the Confrontation Clause: “(1) they involved out-of-court statements 
having the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in crimi-
nal conduct and (2) they involved formalized statements such as affidavits, deposi-
tions, prior testimony, or confessions.”139 The Cellmark report was not prepared 
with the “primary purpose” of making an accusation against a targeted individ-
ual.140 Its primary purpose was to catch a rapist at large, and those involved could 
not have known it would be used against Williams (who was neither under suspi-
cion nor in custody) or anyone else in the law enforcement database.141 It was typi-
cal for lab technicians working on creating DNA profiles to not know what would 
be the consequences of their work, and in many labs, multiple individuals work on 
a profile (which makes it likely that the purpose of each involved individual is sim-
ply to perform her task).142 Justice Alito concluded that use of a DNA report “pre-
pared by a modern, accredited laboratory bears little if any resemblance to the 
historical practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to eliminate.”143 
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion noting that the other opinions failed 
to adequately answer the following question: “How does the Confrontation Clause 
apply to the panoply of crime laboratory reports and underlying technical state-
ments written by (or otherwise made by) laboratory technicians? In this context, 
what, if any, are the outer limits of the ‘testimonial statements’ rule set forth in 
[Crawford]?”144 He believed additional briefing on this issue would be helpful 
136. Id. at 72–74. He also purported to knock down other arguments, advanced by the dissent, that the state 
admitted the report’s “substance” into evidence. Id. at 75–79. He points out, among other things, that Federal 
Rule of Evidence 703 may permit disclosure of “basis evidence” not admissible for its truth to help a jury 
evaluate an expert’s opinion. Id. at 77–78. 
137. Id. at 79. He noted that his conclusion would not lead to abuses suggested by the dissent: (1) trial courts 
could “screen out” experts seeking to act as “mere conduits for hearsay;” (2) experts were normally not permitted 
to disclose inadmissible evidence to juries; (3) limiting jury instructions could be utilized; and (4) where the 
prosecution could not find separately admissible evidence to support foundational facts underlying an expert’s 
testimony, such testimony could not be given weight. Id. at 79–81. 
138. Id. at 81–82. 
139. Id. at 82. 
140. Id. at 84. 
141. Id. at 84–85. 
142. Id. at 85. Justice Alito also added that “the knowledge that defects in a DNA profile may often be 
detected from the profile itself provides a further safeguard.” Id. 
143. Id. at 86 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
144. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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(and so would have set the case for re-argument), but in the absence of that, 
adhered to the dissenting views in Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz.145 He stated 
that he would consider reports such as the one at issue outside the coverage of the 
Confrontation Clause.146 
Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion to again emphasize his 
focus on “formality and solemnity.”147 Because he found that Cellmark’s state-
ments did not have such requisite solemnity and formality, they were not testimo-
nial for Confrontation Clause purposes.148 
Justice Kagan’s dissent was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor.149 The dissent reiterated that: (1) testimony against criminal defend-
ants needed to be subjected to cross-examination; and (2) recent decisions of the 
Court found that if prosecutors wanted to offer forensic testing results into evi-
dence, the defendant must be afforded the right to cross-examine “an analyst” who 
is responsible for the test.150 The dissent considered this an “open-and-shut case” 
where the state did not provide Williams his right to confront.151 The dissent also 
argued that, in view of the plurality and concurring opinions, there were “five 
votes” approving admission of the report, but “not a single good explanation.”152 
In addition, the dissent decried the “uncertainty” the plurality and concurring opin-
ions “sow[ed].”153 
Id. at 141; see also Laird Kirkpatrick, The Admissibility of Forensic Reports in the Post-Justice Scalia 
Supreme Court, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 27, 2019), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2019/08/27/the- 
admissibility-of-forensic-reports-in-the-post-justice-scalia-supreme-court-by-laird-kirkpatrick/ (charging that 
“Stuart v. Alabama is an example of the confusion created by Williams”); Crump, supra note 55, at 151–57. 
For a further discussion of Williams and its implications, see Rothstein, supra note 4. 
It is interesting that Justice Sotomayor joined the dissent in Williams, given that 
the case presented a question similar to the third hypothetical she set out in  
145. Id. at 86–87. Justice Breyer specifically highlighted several previously raised arguments, such as the 
issue of which of many possible laboratory witnesses should testify, and noted that, consistent with the dissents 
in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, states could create an exception which presumptively permits introduction of 
a DNA report from an accredited crime laboratory. Id. at 90–93. 
146. Id. at 99. Under Justice Breyer’s view, the defendant could still call the laboratory employee to testify, 
and could “show the absence or inadequacy of the alternative reliability/honesty safeguards, thereby rebutting 
the presumption and making the Confrontation Clause applicable.” Id. 
147. Id. at 104 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
148. Id. Justice Thomas concluded that the statements by Cellmark were offered for their truth. Id. at 109. 
However, the report was not sufficiently solemn to be testimonial because: (1) it lacked the solemnity of a 
deposition or affidavit; (2) it was neither a certified declaration of fact nor sworn; (3) it did not attest to the fact 
that its statements reflected the testing process or results accurately; (4) neither signing reviewer purported to 
have performed the test or certified the accuracy of those performing the test; and (5) it did not result from any 
formalized dialogue which resembled custodial interrogation (even though it was produced at law enforcement’s 
request). Id. at 110–11. 
149. Id. at 118 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
150. Id. at 119. It should be noted that in other parts of the dissent, Justice Kagan referred to “the analyst.” 
See, e.g., id. at 125. 
151. Id. at 119. 
152. Id. at 120. 
153. 
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Bullcoming as being a potentially different case.154 It may have been that her opin-
ion on the issue evolved, or that she felt there was some distinction between her hy-
pothetical scenario and the facts raised by Williams. 
Since Williams was the Supreme Court’s last major case on the Confrontation 
Clause and forensic analysis evidence, and since it failed to produce a usable ma-
jority, many issues in the area remain unresolved.155 In the next Part, we discuss 
two recent lower court cases decided after Williams: Katso and Stuart. 
II. RECENT ILLUSTRATIVE CASE LAW 
We have selected the post-Williams cases Katso and Stuart because they illus-
trate and inform theories raised in the next section. Although neither are Supreme 
Court precedents—and so neither can resolve the unresolved issues from a prece-
dent standpoint—they offer approaches to certain outstanding items that may be 
instructive. We begin with a discussion of Katso, a Confrontation Clause case that 
arose in the military court-martial context. 
A. United States v. Katso 
In United States v. Katso,156 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
considered the case of a defendant who had been convicted of several offenses by 
a general court-martial, including aggravated sexual assault and burglary.157 After 
the victim reported that she was raped, she was brought to the hospital and a nurse 
examiner collected rectal, oral, and vaginal swabs, along with a blood sample and 
debris from the victim’s clothing.158 Another nurse examiner collected Katso’s sa-
liva and blood, along with penile and scrotal swabs.159 Both nurse examiners 
handed the samples to agents at the Air Force Office of Special Investigations 
(AFOSI).160 Special Agent Blair, an AFOSI Special Agent (SA), testified that he 
received these samples from the two AFOSI agents who were at the hospital, and 
the samples were combined into two “sexual assault kits,” one for Katso and one 
for the alleged victim.161 The agents from the hospital also prepared documents 
accompanying each kit (which SA Blair reviewed), and SA Blair sent such docu-
ments and the evidence to an army criminal investigation laboratory (with a 
request form enclosed reflecting identifying numbers for the evidence, and describ-
ing each piece of evidence).162 
154. See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 673. 
155. See sources cited supra note 153. 
156. 74 M.J. 273 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
157. Id. at 274. 
158. Id. at 275. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
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Robert Fisher, the laboratory employee responsible for conducting the initial 
analysis of the kits, was with his mother in Florida during the court-martial while 
she was undergoing major surgery.163 Instead, the government offered testimony 
regarding the forensic analysis from David Davenport, who conducted a technical 
review of Fisher’s initial analysis.164 Davenport had, at the time of trial, worked at 
the laboratory as a forensic DNA examiner for more than six years.165 
During a hearing on a motion to suppress, Davenport testified to the procedures 
at the laboratory for processing evidence and his technical review of Fisher’s anal-
ysis, which required him to verify the results and approve the report.166 Davenport 
testified at that same hearing that he “independently compared” the relevant DNA 
profiles to verify the matches—which involved processing machine-generate raw 
data, interpreting the profiles for matches, and recalculating the probability of a 
match—and that he agreed with, and initialed, the report.167 
At the court-martial, Davenport testified as an expert witness to provide an inde-
pendent opinion of the DNA analysis results, but the report itself was not admit-
ted.168 Davenport only referenced the report to note that he checked it against the 
documents submitted with the samples (to ensure such samples were properly 
listed and identified) and reviewed Fisher’s interpretation regarding the results.169 
Based on his review, Davenport testified to the following: 
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The evidence collected from [the victim] and [Katso] was tested “per 
protocol,” 
2. The evidence was received in a sealed condition, 
3. The evidence was inventoried properly, 
4. The known samples were analyzed properly, 
5. DNA profiles were generated “from the known blood of [the victim] and 
[Katso],” 
6. The swabs collected from [the victim] contained semen, 
7. DNA consistent with [the victim] and [Katso] was found on the rectal swabs 
from [the victim], 
8. Unidentifiable male DNA was found on [the victim]’s vaginal swab, and 
163. Id. at 276. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 276–77. 
167. Id. at 277. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 277–78. 
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9. DNA consistent with [the victim] and [Katso] was found on [Katso]’s 
penile and scrotal swabs.170 
Davenport also testified regarding the likelihood of a match between the recov-
ered DNA profiles and other individuals.171 On cross-examination, he testified that 
he did not conduct the initial tests that produced the DNA profiles and that the anal-
ysis failed to reveal anything regarding the nature of sexual contact.172 
In rendering its decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces sug-
gested that two questions needed to be considered.173 First, whether the expert 
relied on out-of-court testimonial statements when testifying.174 Second, if so, 
whether the expert’s testimony was still admissible because the expert reached his 
own conclusions predicated on knowledge of underlying facts and data, such that 
the expert was, himself, the “witness[] against” the defendant.175 
On the first question, the court concluded that many of the statements and data 
that Davenport relied upon, such as material in the case file, were not testimo-
nial.176 For example, the court noted that nothing suggested that the documents 
from AFOSI were testimonial (they primarily related to chain of custody), or that 
the raw data generated was either testimonial or a statement.177 Nor was there any 
indication that the lab results or notes from Fisher which underlay the report were 
signed, had indicia of formality, certified anything, or that Fisher anticipated their 
use at trial.178 Further, it was “clearly erroneous” for the lower court to find that 
Davenport was only able to identify Katso by name through repeating testimonial 
statements in the report, since the record suggested he learned the parties’ names 
through review of the underlying data.179 The court concluded that Davenport’s 
statements regarding proper receipt, inventory, testing, and analysis of the evi-
dence, along with his identification of the relevant parties, were admissible because 
they relied on nontestimonial items.180 The report itself, however, was more com-
plicated, and the court decided to assume, arguendo, that parts of it were testimo-
nial for purposes of its second question.181 
As to the second question, the court noted that the Supreme Court had never 
faced a situation directly on point and that Davenport was neither a “surrogate”  
170. Id. at 278. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 279. 
174. Id. (citations omitted). 
175. Id. (citations omitted). 
176. Id. at 279–80. 
177. Id. at 280. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. The court noted that although the report did not contain any formal certification, Fisher knew that 
Katso was a suspect and that the report “would be ‘made official and sent to the agent in the case.’” Id. 
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expert nor a “mere conduit” for others’ testimonial statements.182 Unlike in 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the government here had not sought to admit the 
relevant report (or certificate) into evidence.183 Further, in Melendez-Diaz the cer-
tificates included a “bare-bones statement” and failed to provide the petitioner with 
an opportunity to learn about the tests or the analysts’ ability to interpret them.184 
In contrast, Davenport’s knowledge of the underlying facts and testimony afforded 
Katso the opportunity to determine which tests Fisher performed, whether such 
tests were routine, and whether Davenport possessed the requisite skills and judg-
ment to interpret the results.185 
Similarly, Davenport was different than the “surrogate” witness disallowed in 
Bullcoming.186 Based on his personal knowledge, Davenport described the tests, 
testing process, and means for discerning lapses in protocol.187 Unlike the non- 
testifying analyst in Bullcoming, Fisher had also not been placed on unpaid leave 
for unknown reasons, but was instead spending time with his ill mother (suggesting 
neither that he was incompetent nor that the government was seeking a tactical 
advantage).188 Davenport also confirmed that he was testifying to, and had formed, 
an independent opinion, which provided an opportunity for cross-examination.189 
The court further found that Davenport’s review would seemingly place the pres-
ent case within one of Justice Sotomayor’s hypotheticals in her concurring opinion 
in Bullcoming, that “the testimony might have been admissible if the expert had 
some ‘degree of involvement’ in the testing process, as when ‘the person testifying 
is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connec-
tion to the test at issue.’”190 Moreover, unlike in Williams—in which the testifying 
expert had not witnessed any of the work or calibrations, but trusted the lab to do 
reliable work since it was accredited—Davenport: (1) saw all work underlying the 
tests and calibrations; (2) closely scrutinized and analyzed the results; (3) com-
pared the profiles; and (4) re-ran the statistical analysis.191 
Without guiding precedent, the court found that where an expert relies in part on 
out-of-court statements by a declarant, the admissibility of the expert’s opinion 
turns upon the degree of “independent analysis” undertaken by the expert in arriv-
ing at her opinion.192 On the one hand, an expert may not be a “conduit” for 
182. Id. at 275, 281 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
183. Id. at 281. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. (citation omitted). 
191. Id. at 282. The court also argued that these actions by Davenport would seem to satisfy the concerns of 
Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion and Justice Kagan in the dissent. Id. The court also pointed out “the 
lack of majority support in Williams for any point but the result[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
192. Id. 
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relaying testimonial hearsay and act as a “transmitter” rather than communicating 
her “independent judgment.”193 On the other hand, expert witnesses did not need 
to personally perform a test in order to interpret and review the data or results of 
such test.194 In the context of the present case, the court concluded that Davenport 
offered his independent expert opinion and that the Confrontation Clause was not 
violated by its admission.195 
The takeaway from Katso seems to be that there was an ample basis to challenge 
and evaluate the report because the expert witness had so exhaustively examined 
all the underlying paperwork from the various analysts whose work went into the 
report.196 A pivotal innovation lies at the basis of the Katso court’s reasoning: only 
the final report was testimonial, and only it needed to be justified by a “not for 
truth” analysis. The underlying paperwork of all the component analysts was only 
for quality control and not intended for evidence, so it was not testimonial.197 If 
extended, this concept might help alleviate the issue of who, in a string of analysts, 
must take the stand. Extrapolating even further, the Katso court’s emphasis on the 
exhaustiveness of the expert witness’s review of the underlying work leaves open 
the theoretical possibility that an expert unaffiliated with a laboratory—who is 
engaged by the laboratory solely to testify and conducts an exhaustive review in 
preparation for such testimony—could suffice. 
Although the report itself was not admitted in Katso, the case reinforces the con-
cept that more than a mere “surrogate” or “conduit” expert may satisfy the Clause, 
provided certain conditions—such as personal involvement and independence— 
are satisfied. In Stuart, discussed below, the Alabama court seemingly went even 
further than the court in Katso and accepted a more remote supervisor as a suffi-
cient witness. 
B. Stuart v. Alabama 
In Stuart v. Alabama,198 Vanessa Stuart was convicted of, among other things, 
criminally-negligent homicide.199 Police found Stuart and the deceased victim after 
193. Id. (citation omitted). 
194. Id. For example, the court noted that an expert who repeats statements from inadmissible cover 
memoranda violates the Clause; such witness “should have ‘proffer[ed] a proper expert opinion based on 
machine-generated data and calibration charts, his knowledge, education, and experience and his review of the 
drug testing reports alone.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
195. Id. at 283–84. The dissenting judge felt that Katso should have had the Confrontation Clause right to 
cross-examine Fisher regarding whether he followed the protocols for preparing the samples and potential 
contamination. Id. at 284 (Ohlson, J., dissenting). 
196. In United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988), Justice Scalia made clear in a different 
confrontation context, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees only a good basis, not a perfect basis, to evaluate 
credibility in cross examination. Id. (“[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective 
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense 
might wish.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
197. Katso, 74 M.J. at 279–84. 
198. Stuart v. Alabama, 268 So.3d. 607, cert denied, 139 S.Ct. 36 (2018). 
199. Id. at 1a, 2a. 
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responding to a 911 call relating to an accident on the interstate.200 One of the offi-
cers testified that, while Stuart was being helped by emergency personnel, the offi-
cer smelled alcohol as Stuart passed.201 Stuart was brought to the hospital and 
advised of her rights, but refused a blood test.202 After she tried to leave and was 
arrested, her blood was drawn pursuant to a search warrant.203 Forensic analysis 
showed that more than four hours after the accident, she had a blood-alcohol level 
of 0.174 (which Dr. Jason Hudson, Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences 
(DFS) toxicology section chief, estimated would have been higher at the time of 
the accident).204 In appealing her conviction, Stuart argued, among other things, 
that the lower court erred in admitting forensic evidence through testimony from a 
state’s witness, Hudson, who did not perform the blood analysis.205 Specifically, 
Stuart argued that it was a violation of her Confrontation Clause rights that the 
court permitted Hudson to testify as to the results of her blood analysis when no 
evidence established that he had supervisory duties with respect to her case, signed 
any reports, or reviewed the findings.206 Furthermore, he was not even employed at 
the DFS when such analysis was conducted.207 
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Stuart’s conviction and found 
that her Confrontation Clause rights were not violated by permitting Hudson to tes-
tify to the results of the blood analysis.208 In making this finding, the court noted: 
Dr. Hudson gave extensive testimony regarding the policies and procedures 
of the DFS’s toxicology laboratory. This included controls in the analysis 
and the laboratory’s standard practice of having the results of the analysis 
independently reviewed. Dr. Hudson testified that, “as the [toxicology] sec-
tion chief, I’m fundamentally the toxicology supervisor so I’m responsible 
for the day-to-day workflow in the laboratory, testing assignments for cases, 
as well as personnel management.” . . . “This testimony provided [Stuart] 
with ample opportunity to cross-examine [Hudson] regarding the [blood]- 
analysis report.”209 
The Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari on March 16, 2018.210 Stuart 
then filed a U.S. Supreme Court certiorari petition, arguing that the decision below 
was contrary to Bullcoming.211 The petition was denied on November 19, 2018.212 
200. Id. at 2a. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 3a. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 3a, 8a. 
206. Id. at 8a. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 13a, 19a. 
209. Id. at 13a (citations omitted). 
210. Id. at 21a. 
211. See Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36 (2018). 
212. See id. 
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Justice Gorsuch authored a strong dissent from the denial of certiorari (joined, 
interestingly, by Justice Sotomayor), in which he was highly critical of Williams 
and argued that permitting Alabama to produce an analyst other than the one who 
performed the blood-alcohol test violated the Confrontation Clause.213 Justice 
Gorsuch recognized the increasing importance of forensic evidence in modern 
criminal trials.214 He emphasized the need for cross-examination and the right to 
confront in view of the risk of “mischief” or “mistake” on the part of forensic ana-
lysts, such as when an analyst alters evidence, contaminates a sample, or makes an 
error during testing.215 
Justice Gorsuch stated that he believed the Confrontation Clause was vio-
lated in Stuart, but noted that the “problem appear[ed] to be largely of [the 
Supreme Court’s] creation” in view of Williams, which “yielded no majority 
and its various opinions have sown confusion in courts across the country.”216 
He criticized Alabama’s alternative contentions that: (1) the report was offered 
as a basis for expert testimony rather than for its truth; and (2) the report was 
not “testimonial.”217 
On the first point, Justice Gorsuch emphasized that although Williams had no 
majority opinion, at least five of the Justices rightfully rejected that concept and 
questioned why any prosecutor would seek to offer the report other than to prove 
the truth of the report’s assertions.218 He argued that the “whole point” was to 
show that, due to the report’s truth, the jury should credit the testifying expert’s 
opinion as to the blood-alcohol level some hours later.219 On the second point, 
Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the “fractured” Williams decision revealed the 
argument to be flawed in the views of eight Justices.220 
According to Justice Gorsuch, the Williams plurality took the position that a for-
ensic report was only testimonial where it was “prepared for the primary purpose 
of accusing a targeted individual who is in custody [or] under suspicion.”221 The 
dissent took the broader view that, even if a report is devised with a purely investi-
gative purpose and with no target in mind, it could be testimonial when “made 
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that [it] would be available for use at a later trial.”222 Using even the more restric-
tive standard of the plurality, Justice Gorsuch argued that the report in Stuart 
would be testimonial, since there was “no question” Stuart was in custody when 
the test was conducted or that the forensic report was prepared with the “primary 
213. Id. at 36–37 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
214. Id. at 36. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 37. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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purpose” of securing Stuart’s conviction.223 Justice Gorsuch concluded his dissent 
by registering his belief that the Court “owe[d]” lower courts, which were “strug-
gling to abide” by the Supreme Court’s holdings, greater clarity.224 
This dissent is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it provides insight into 
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion on the Confrontation Clause. Since Williams, Justice 
Scalia (the author of Crawford and one its strongest proponents) and Justice 
Kennedy have been replaced by Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. It is unclear 
exactly how these new Justices will rule on Confrontation Clause matters.225 
It is especially difficult to know how the new Justices would rule because traditional “conservative” and 
“liberal” distinctions are often unhelpful in predicting Justices’ behavior in respect of the Confrontation Clause. 
If, for instance, the new Justices subscribe to Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Clause, the strength of some of 
the theories we will discuss in the next section might be different than if they adopt a view more similar to the 
other “conservative” Justices. Reviewing prior decisions of the two new Justices is of limited value, since the 
new Justices might have simply felt bound to apply Supreme Court precedent. For instance, although it was 
decided before Williams, it could potentially be noteworthy that in United States v. Moore, then-Circuit Judge 
Kavanaugh found the introduction into evidence of autopsy and drug analysis-related reports contravened the 
Confrontation Clause because the authors of the reports were not made available for cross-examination. See 651 
F.3d 30, 71–72 (D.C. Cir. 2011). However, in Moore, the court’s opinion discussed and purported to apply 
Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming, and so it may simply reflect then-Circuit Judge Kavanaugh’s desire 
to follow standing Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 70–74. Similarly, one could try to read “tea leaves” in 
connection with Justice Gorsuch’s findings prior to being elevated to the Supreme Court, but it would still not be 
fully clear how he would rule as a Justice. See, e.g., United States. v. Keck, 643 F.3d 789, 797 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(spreadsheets of “MoneyGram” transactions not testimonial). Stuart has caused some commenters to believe 
Justice Gorsuch will take Justice Scalia’s stance on the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, 
First word from Justice Gorsuch on the Confrontation Clause, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), http:// 
confrontationright.blogspot.com/2018/11/first-word-from-justice-gorsuch-on.html (arguing that it appears 
Justice Gorsuch is a “tiger” on the Confrontation Clause and will take Justice Scalia’s position, but noting it is 
not clear where Justice Kavanaugh stands); Kirkpatrick, supra note 153 (“[I]t appears that Justice Gorsuch would 
support the result in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming and agree with the dissent in Williams, just as Justice Scalia 
did. It remains to be seen what position Justice Kavanaugh will take on these questions.”). 
However, Justice Gorsuch’s Stuart opinion suggests his position on the Clause’s 
application to forensic reports might be closer to that of Justice Scalia than to cer-
tain of the other “conservative” Justices.226 Second, given that Justice Sotomayor 
joined the dissent, this may be further evidence that her position on the Clause has 
evolved since she set out her hypotheticals in Bullcoming, and that her position in 
Williams better reflects where she currently stands on the Clause.227 Third, that the 
dissent so strongly criticized Williams and called for greater clarity in the law may 
mean that the Court will soon take a case which it considers a better vehicle for set-
ting out clearer rules in this area. 
In any event, without further guidance from the Supreme Court in Stuart, prose-
cutors and defendants will continue to need to be guided by Williams and relevant 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. 
226. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 225; Kirkpatrick, supra note 153. 
227. See Stuart, 139 S. Ct. at 36; see also Friedman, supra note 225 (“And another piece of good news [from 
Stuart] is that Justice Sotomayor felt called upon to join the dissent; on this part of Confrontation Clause 
doctrine, at least, it appears that she is now in the right corner.”). It is also possible, as noted above, that Justice 
Sotomayor sees some important distinction between her hypothetical in Bullcoming and the facts in Williams. 
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lower court interpretations. The next Part presents six theories through which it 
may be argued that forensic analysis evidence is admissible consistent with the 
Clause. 
III. THEORIES FOR ADMISSION OF FORENSIC ANALYSIS EVIDENCE 
At present, there are at least six theories for entering forensic analysis evidence 
without supporting testimony from the analyst who conducted the original analysis 
or test. Although these theories may not work individually, they may be combined 
to formulate an argument for admissibility.228 
A. Theory 1: Report Itself Not Testimonial 
The first theory for admitting forensic analysis evidence consistent with the 
Confrontation Clause is admitting the report when the report itself is not testimo-
nial. Pursuant to this theory—assuming the report would otherwise be admissible 
under relevant evidence rules229—it would be admissible without the need to pro-
duce any supporting expert witness.230 
One example of this theory in practice might be where a psychiatric or medical 
report is compiled outside the context of a criminal prosecution. Such a report 
might be created for treatment reasons, but then becomes useful in a subsequent 
criminal case. In that instance, the report would not have been created for the “pri-
mary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony”231 and 
might not be found testimonial. 
Another practical example might be an autopsy report, depending on the rele-
vant circumstances, including the purpose for the autopsy and the report’s creation. 
It is important to keep this theory distinct from the idea, discussed further below, 
of offering an otherwise testimonial report for reasons other than for its truth. 
B. Theory 2: Report Used as Basis for Expert Testimony, Not for Truth 
A second theory is using the report or forensic analysis evidence as a basis for 
expert testimony rather than for its truth.232 This is the first Williams plurality 
route,233 and the current strength of this theory is unclear. At the time of Williams,  
228. It is important to note two items here. First, because the views of at least the two new Justices are not 
fully clear on all points, the strengths or weaknesses of these theories may be altered based on such views. 
Second, we are focused not only on whether a forensic report is admissible—directly or through some form of 
recounting of it by the expert witness on the stand—but also on when the information in the report is something 
upon which the expert’s opinion relies in some way. 
229. For instance, the requirements for authentication and relevance would still need to be met. 
230. A certification might also be admitted pursuant to this theory, assuming the certification itself is not 
testimonial. 
231. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358–59 (2011). 
232. See supra Part I.C.3. 
233. See supra Part I.C.3. 
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it counted only four Justices as adherents, a n d  two Justices f r o m  
Wi l l i ams 234 have also since been replaced. Although the views of these new 
Justices are unclear, Justice Gorsuch seems opposed to this theory based on his 
criticisms of the Williams plurality on this point in his Stuart opinion.235 
To strengthen this approach, a few items need to be kept in mind. First, Williams 
was a bench trial236 so this theory might be harder to use in a jury trial.237 Second, 
if used in a jury trial, it would strengthen this theory if the prosecution presents the 
evidence clearly and makes very clear to the jury that the testimonial material is 
only being used to provide the basis for the expert’s testimony and not for its truth. 
Third, it would strengthen this theory to use a hypothetical question from the pros-
ecutor to the testifying expert, such as: “assuming fact 1, fact 2, and fact 3 are true, 
what would your opinion be as to . . . ?” The hypothetical question would help 
demonstrate to a jury that the facts are not offered for their truth. In connection 
with use of such hypothetical question, the prosecution should make sure to have 
independent, admissible evidence of the hypothetical facts relied upon by the 
expert (i.e., the facts contained in the report). Finally, the testifying expert must be 
giving an actual independent opinion rather than attempting to act as a mere “con-
duit” for the otherwise testimonial statements of individuals involved in the test or 
analysis. 
C. Theory 3: Report Not Specifically Accusatory
A third potential theory might be arguing that the report or forensic analysis evi-
dence is not specifically accusatory.238 This is the second Williams plurality route, 
and again, the strength of this theory is unclear for the reasons noted above.239 
An example of this theory might be where the alleged perpetrator was not a sus-
pect at the time the report was prepared. Subsequently, however, the alleged perpe-
trator is connected to the crime and the prosecution wants to use the report against 
the perpetrator at trial. In that event, consistent with the first theory, the report 
would not be testimonial and there would be no need to produce a supporting 
expert for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. 
D. Theory 4: Informality of Report
A fourth, albeit weaker, theory is arguing a report or certification lacks sufficient 
“solemnity” or “formality” to constitute a testimonial statement. Without the sup-
port of the other Justices, Justice Thomas has been relatively consistent in 
234. See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012). 
235. See Stuart v. Alabama 139 S. Ct. 36, 36–37 (2018); see also Friedman, supra note 225; Kirkpatrick, 
supra note 153. 
236. Williams, 567 U.S. at 56. 
237. At least in theory, judges should be more able to utilize evidence for a permissible purpose than jurors. 
238. See supra Part I.C.3. 
239. Williams, 567 U.S. at 81–86. 
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requiring some degree of solemnity in determining whether the forensic statement 
is testimonial. For instance, Justice Thomas considered the statements in 
Melendez-Diaz (in which the findings of the forensic analysis were contained in 
sworn certificates) and Bullcoming (in which, albeit not formally sworn, the ana-
lyst’s “certificate” was “formalized in a signed document”) sufficiently solemn to 
be deemed testimonial.240 In Williams, by contrast, Justice Thomas considered the 
report not to have affirmed or certified anything, and he concluded that the report 
lacked sufficient formality to be deemed testimonial.241 Although Justice Thomas 
appears to be the lone adherent to formality as a standalone theory, formality could 
be combined with other theories, such as those based on the Williams plurality 
views, to strengthen other theories. 
It is important to note, however, that prosecutors may not engage in “bad-faith 
attempts” to evade formality and “conspir[e] to elude confrontation by using only 
informal extrajudicial statements against an accused.”242 Justice Thomas has 
emphasized that the Confrontation Clause would reach such “bad-faith attempts” 
at evasion.243 Moreover, even if it were not bad faith for a prosecutor to use less 
formal statements to obviate the need to comply with the Clause, Justice Thomas 
has noted that such statements might be seen as less reliable or persuasive by the 
fact finder.244 
E. Theory 5: Supporting Witness More Than “Surrogate” or Mere “Conduit” 
A fifth theory is offering a witness that is more than a mere “conduit” or “surro-
gate.” Katso brings into focus the issue of who is the relevant witness: the testimo-
nial report or the expert on the stand.245 Is the expert a mere “conduit” or 
sufficiently independent? This question depends on a number of factors. First, the 
prominence of the report in the trial is relevant—i.e., was it introduced, and if not, 
how extensively was it mentioned? Second, the extent of the testifying expert’s 
own independent judgment and input in offering her opinion is important. This 
would include looking at the extent of her involvement in the actual test, the labo-
ratory conducting the test, other tests of the same kind, or a combination of these 
factors. It would also include looking into the thoroughness of her review of the 
non-testimonial material underlying the report. Third, it is likely vital that the 
entire analysis can be sufficiently tested by cross-examining the testifying expert. 
This last point seems to be a key underpinning of the analysis. 
Consistent with Katso, the expert should ideally be very closely connected to the 
laboratory and testing process and exhaustively informed regarding the specific 
240. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 664–65 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 
305, 329 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
241. Williams, 567 U.S. at 103–04 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
242. Id. at 113. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. See supra Part II.A; United States v. Katso, 74 M.J. 273 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
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test.246 The expert should also be qualified and able to testify regarding tremendous 
steps of internal validation.247 The expert should then base her own wholly inde-
pendent opinion in part on the analysis, and not act as a mere mechanism for intro-
ducing evidence in the report, which might otherwise be excluded.248 
There are at least two difficulties in using the Katso analysis as a means of 
admitting evidence in future cases. First, it is unclear whether future courts will fol-
low Katso’s analysis. Second, it is unclear how much less involvement, connec-
tion, and independence than was present in Katso might suffice. If, for example, 
Stuart were to represent a forward trend in court thinking, then a much more 
remote supervisor might be sufficient. If not, the somewhat high bar set by Katso 
may be required. Without further guidance from the courts, the selected witness 
should be as involved, connected, qualified, and independent as practicable. 
F. Theory 6: Notice and Demand Without Demand 
The sixth theory for entering forensic analysis evidence consistent with the 
Confrontation Clause is to bring the criminal action in a state with a so-called 
“notice and demand” law and have the defendant fail to make a demand.249 
Pursuant to such a law, the accused has the right to confront a witness sufficient to 
support admission of the forensic report, but must demand that right after receiving 
notice from the prosecution of the prosecution’s intention to utilize the forensic 
report.250 If such law were applicable and if the accused did not make the demand 
within the required period, the prosecution would be free to introduce the report 
without the need for a supporting witness.251 
This “notice and demand” mechanism has been seemingly approved by the 
Supreme Court in dicta.252 In Melendez-Diaz, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion dis-
cussed the existence of such procedures as a means of refuting the argument that 
the “sky [would] fall” due to the majority’s decision.253 Accordingly, such a proce-
dure should be found consistent with the Clause. 
Although each of the above six theories will not be applicable in every case, 
these theories represent the arguments most likely to be persuasive to a court based 
on current law, and so these are the issues local stakeholders should be 
considering. 
246. See supra Part II.A; United States v. Katso, 74 M.J. 273 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
247. See supra Part II.A; United States v. Katso, 74 M.J. 273 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
248. See supra Part II.A; United States v. Katso, 74 M.J. 273 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
249. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 325–27 (2009) (citing to provisions in Georgia, 
Texas, and Ohio). 
250. See id. 
251. See id. 
252. See id. 
253. Id. at 325. 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article is to analyze modern Confrontation Clause and for-
ensic analysis case law and to present six theories through which to argue that for-
ensic analysis evidence is admissible consistent with the Clause. Eventually, it will 
be important for local stakeholders to have true clarity and certainty on this devel-
oping, but confused, area of law. 
Producing the analyst who actually conducted a forensic test can be costly and 
extremely difficult for local prosecutors and laboratories. As use of artificial intelli-
gence, blockchain, and smart technology becomes increasingly pervasive,254 it will 
only become more difficult to identify who should be a “witness” for purposes of 
the Clause (assuming human intervention is still necessary). At the same time, the 
law must continue to safeguard the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, 
even where it may not always be easy or convenient to do so. One day soon, the 
Supreme Court may need to again face these issues, but until then, it is hoped that 
the theories presented here will arm local stakeholders with arguments to consider 
when playing the admissibility game of “cat and mouse.”  
254. See, e.g., PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE 
(2018); Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy, 21 YALE J. L. & 
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BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 86 (2019); Kevin P. Lee, A Preface to the Philosophy of Legal Information, 20 SMU 
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